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 Streszczenie 
Artykuł niniejszy omawia historyczny rozwój parol evidence rule (czyli reguły prawa 
materialnego zakazującej sądom dopuszczania na okoliczność treści bądź wykładni dokumentu 
extrinsic evidence, czyli dowodów innych niż sam dokument) w angielskim common law od 
czasów prawa anglo-normańskiego aż do uchwalenia w 1677 r. Statute of Frauds. Wczesne 
prawo angielskie charakteryzowała ogólna dopuszczalność takich dowodów. Dokumenty 
pisemne nie cieszyły się zaufaniem niepiśmiennej społeczności, uważano także, że sama 
czynność prawna dochodzi do skutku poza dokumentem. Dokument mógł więc mieć w 
najlepszym razie znaczenie jedynie dowodowe. Potrzeby praktyki handlowej i malejący 
analfabetyzm umożliwiły pojawienie się przekonania, że istota czynności prawnej zawartej w 
formie pisemnej jest związana ściśle i zależna od samego dokumentu. Przekonanie owo, wraz z 
brakiem zaufania i niechęcią sędziów do przysięgłych, jako skorych do wydawania rozstrzygnięć 
sprzecznych z treścią dokumentów, doprowadziły sędziów do wysnucia parol evidence rule. 
Zasada ta swój najszerszy zakres przyjęła z chwilą uchwalenia Statute of Frauds. Wprowadzony 
wówczas wymóg dokonywania szerokich kategorii czynności prawnych w formie pisemnej pod 
rygorem nieważności był przez angielskich prawników postrzegany jako potwierdzenie parol 
evidence rule na gruncie ustawowym. 
 
Słowa kluczowe: Common law, historia common law, procedura cywilna, dowody, historia 
prawa. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In English common law the parol evidence rule is, following the academic definition, a 
rule that states that any evidence that is extrinsic to a written document (known as parol 
evidence, where parol means not only oral but actually pertains to any evidence extrinsic to 
the contents of a writing) cannot be used to add to, vary or contradict what is encompassed 
in that writing (in a document)1.  
Even though the parol evidence rule is steadily mentioned and elaborated in numerous 
modern textbooks2, it has, since it emerged and reached its peak significance and extent, 
been subsequently subject to numerous exceptions. Consequently, the rule has been liberal-
ised3 to such an extent that some have said it does not exist anymore4.  
The purpose of this article, however, is to retrace the changes in the realm of admissi-
bility of extrinsic evidence in written documents since the early Anglo-Norman law and 
throughout the next centuries in the context of the subsequent emergence of the parol evi-
dence rule and its development up to the early eighteenth century, when it reached its ma-
ture form and its peak significance in judicial practice. As early as in the nineteenth century, 
common law judges began forming exceptions to the rule which subsequently led it to its 
current status, where some argue that it is highly doubtful that the rule would today, e.g., 
prevent a party from bringing in extrinsic evidence of terms that the parties intended to form 
a part of the agreement with5. 
Notwithstanding the above, the strict form of the parol evidence rule meant that it was 
perceived as a substantive legal rule which stated that if a contract had been done in writing 
it could not be challenged by past or contemporary extrinsic6 evidence contradicting it or 
                                                          
1 G.H. Treitel, The Law of Contract, Eleventh Edition, London 2003, p. 346. 
2 See e.g.: Treitel, above; R. Stone, The Modern Law of Contract, 8th edition, London 2009; S. Williston, The 
Law of Contracts, Volume I, New York 1920, i.a. p. 247-248, ; J. Beatson, A. Burrows, J. Cartwright, Anson’s 
Law of Contract, 29th edition, Oxford 2010, p. 138. 
3 Anson’s Law of Contract, p. 138; Law Commission of England and Wales Report no. 154 (1986), paras 2.3.-
2.4. 
4 Law Com Report no. 154, supra; K. Lewinson, The interpretation of contracts, 1989, pp. 34-37. 
5 A.L. Zuppi, The parol evidence rule: A comparative study of the common law, the civil law and lex mercatoria, 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 35, no. 2, 2007, p. 242. 
6 I.e. external to the written instrument (document). 
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modifying its content. The rule’s evolution until it reached its historical peak in terms of its 
importance and extent in the eighteenth century is the subject of this article. 
1.2 PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS AS TO THE RULE ITSELF 
It is important to notice that in the common law the parol evidence rule is not a rule of 
evidence7, a procedural rule8 or a defence9. It is a substantive legal rule dealing with the 
nature of legal acts10. There are actually three specific rules that together form what is called 
the parol evidence rule11: first, preventing the contents of a document being proved by any 
means other than the production of the document itself12; second, pertaining to the inadmis-
sibility of extrinsic evidence for the purpose of adding to, varying, contradicting or subtract-
ing from the terms of the document13; and third, providing for the inadmissibility of extrin-
sic evidence to help in the interpretation of documents. Thus, if these rules were to be rigor-
ously followed, no facts, representations and undertakings of the parties to the contract, 
apart from what was provided for in the writing itself, could be efficiently enforced as bind-
ing, as no evidence to it would be allowed to be accepted by a court. 
Nowadays, as was presented above, oftentimes the parol evidence rule appears to be 
deemed increasingly less rigid, with some scholars suggesting that it is no more than a doc-
trine according to which the written terms of the contract shall enjoy a “position of interpre-
tive priority”14. Such a standpoint is, as we shall see later, consistent with the demise of the 
parol evidence rule in modern common law, for which, it may well be argued, there were 
justified reasons. This article, however, shall relate to the “strict version” of the parol evi-
dence rule as described at the beginning of this paragraph. 
                                                          
7 J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, Boston 1898, c. 10. 
8 S. Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence, Boston 1883. 
9 As seen in the case of Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 32 Cal. 4th 336, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 97, 83 P.3d 497 (2004). 
10 J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, Boston 1898, c. 10. 
11 Law Commission of England and Wales, Law of Contract: The Parol Evidence Rule (1976), paras 4 and 5. 
12 Also known as the “best evidence rule”. 
13 Thus making the writing conclusive. 
14 James J. White, Robert Summers, Robert Hillman, Uniform Commercial Code, § 2-9, at 95. 
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It shall also be submitted that the aspects of legal acts that the parol evidence rule in-
volves are as follows: the creation of a legal act, its integration, solemnisation and interpre-
tation15. This article is concerned with the second aspect above, understood as relating to the 
conclusiveness of the written instrument, exclusively encompassing the terms of a legal act 
(here: a contract). 
1.3 PERIODISATION 
It is proposed that the history of the parol evidence rule’s development law can be di-
vided into four periods16:  
I. From the beginning of Anglo-Saxon rule in England that is roughly parallel to the 
barbarian invasions in Europe17 and to the emergence of the seal in the 13th cen-
tury – a period characterised by a general disputability regarding written in-
struments and a general prevalence of extrinsic, especially oral, evidence over 
the contents of documents, 
II. from the emergence of the seal to the enactment of the Statute of Frauds and Perjur-
ies in 1677 and the subsequent years – a period when the parol evidence rule fi-
nally emerged, began to take hold and reached its historical peak,  
III. from then on until the 19th century – a period of slow decomposition and the emer-
gence of exceptions,  
IV. from then on until the modern times – a period of stabilisation of the rule with nu-
merous exceptions to its validity. 
This article, which aims to retrace the emergence and development of the rule up to the 
point of its peak significance and its strictest meaning, shall concentrate on the first two 
periods. 
                                                          
15 J. Wigmore, A Brief History of the Parol Evidence Rule, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5 (May, 1904), p. 
338. 
16 Agreeing substantially with Wigmore, op. cit., p. 339, with his division into three periods, one must note that 
upon the passing of roughly a century from the publishing of his notorious article and having regard for further 
development (or, as stated above, demise) of the parol evidence rule, another period needs to be listed. 
17 J.L. Myers (The English Settlements, London 1986, Chapter 4: The Romano-British Background and the Sax-
on Shore) states that he encountered and identified evidence of the Germanic presence in Britain during Roman 
rule. 
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2. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE IN COMMON LAW UNTIL THE ENACTMENT OF THE STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS 
2.1. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE IN ROMAN LAW 
Early Roman law was characterised by strict formalism with respect to the formation of 
contracts. For an obligation to come into being, one required to employ stipulatio – the tra-
ditional oral form of concluding legally binding agreements that was based on a strict ques-
tion-and-answer formula18. At that time, all matters of evidence regarding the formation and 
content of an obligation were left to the judges’ discretion19. Later, however, the formalism 
regarding a stipulatio was gradually relaxed. With the diminishing rigidness of stipulatio the 
role of a written instrument – the document – rose. At the beginning the document had a 
purely evidential meaning, treated by judges as evidence confirming the prior making of a 
stipulatio. The fact that a document contained a promise to carry out a stipulatio was 
thought to prove, by means of presumption, that a stipulatio had in fact been done, though 
contrary evidence was possible and admissible. Nevertheless, it was always clear to the 
Romans that a contract was concluded “elsewhere”, i.e. beyond the document, within the 
formulas of the stipulation. Documents were utilised for purposes of gathering evidence as 
protection against fading memories and in case of a trial. The importance of what the Ro-
man law contended may seem irrelevant to the later English common law, but the fact that 
the Roman law had never developed the concept of a juridical act (a contract) coming into 
existence solely within a writing corresponded with the views of the Germanic peoples that 
directly formed the roots of the early common law. 
2.2. BARBARIAN LAW AND EARLY COMMON LAW – GENERAL DISPUTABILITY OF 
THE CONTENT OF A DOCUMENT 
Contrary, however, to the general formalism attributable to early European mediaeval 
law, after the fall of the Roman Empire within the legal systems of the Germanic nations 
there “was certainly no notion of the indisputability of the terms of a document”20. The for-
malism of that time extended to modes of carrying out legal acts (e.g. transferring property) 
but did not result in the indisputability of documents. It is argued that such a situation re-
                                                          
18 R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations. Roman Foundations of Civilian Tradition, Oxford 1996, p. 68. 
19 Ibidem, p. 71. 
20 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 339. 
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sulted from the very character of the Germanic tribes. These tribes were characterised by a 
general illiteracy, ranging from the lower classes to the elites. Having advanced into Europe, 
the barbarians brought with them, together with their general illiteracy, a legal system that 
was based on oral forms of transactions. Though, upon absorbing the lands of a predomi-
nantly Roman legal culture they encountered a system based on a preference for written 
juridical acts and an advanced habit of transactions made via notarial documents, the barbar-
ic traditions seemed to have prevailed. In Merovingian and Carolingian monarchies the old 
Romanesque trait of using written documents initially subsisted, but by the tenth century it 
was eliminated, and the post-barbaric populace en masse returned to their old means of han-
dling transactions only orally21.  
England, inhabited by Germanic tribes, followed suit. In the early mediaeval period 
most transactions were oral. “In pre-conquest England, virtually all business transactions 
were communicated orally and trusted to memory”22. Even the wills of Anglo-Saxon Eng-
land, which were unique in that they were often written down by witnesses, did not require 
any writing: to the contrary, as they were subject to Germanic law, the preparation and sign-
ing of a document was not at all required23. One of the peculiarities of the early English law 
was that a document (carta) was perceived as one of the symbols convenient in handling 
formalistic transactions, on a par with a wand, a glove or a knife24, thus gaining an inde-
pendent meaning that was separate from its verbal content. 
2.3. WHENCE THE RELUCTANCE? 
It is hardly arguable that the general illiteracy of the era (ranging from the “lowest churl 
to the great Emperor Charles”25 was the reason for written documents being perceived as 
precarious to some extent. Nowadays, used to the fact that we ourselves prepare in detail (or 
are capable of preparing) and undersign documents, we take it for granted that they are pre-
cisely what they are. Then “the grantor of land, the borrower of money, could neither read 
                                                          
21 Ficker, Beiträge zur Urkundenlehre, 1887, p. 83-90. 
22 J.R. Wigglesworth, Science and Technology in Medieval European Life, London 2006, p. 18. 
23 M.M. Sheehan, J.K. Farge, Marriage, Family and Law in Medieval Europe. Collected Studies, Toronto 1997, 
p. 5. 
24 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 340. 
25 Andreas Heusler, Institutionen des Deutschen Privatrechts, Erster Band, Leipzig 1885 [translation quoted 
after Wigmore, op. cit.]. 
  11 
nor write the document […] he could but mark his cross at the bottom and hope it was al-
right”26. It is not surprising, then, that a document gained the meaning of a token of transac-
tion. The seller of land could transfer the title by the old form of sale and vestitura or he 
could simply transfer it via the document (through “venditio per cartam”). The tradition 
carta itself in land transfers was a formalised act, done by the document signor grasping a 
blank parchment, lifting it from the ground, asking the witnesses to grasp it with him, hand-
ing it to the scribe to do the writing and, finally, handing it over, i.e. delivering it, to the 
purchaser. The convenience of venditio per cartam lay in the ability to transfer land symbol-
ically, i.e. without the requirement of being present at the land being sold. Ficker, though, 
accurately noticed that it also allowed the names of the witnesses to be preserved in writ-
ing27. What is, however, essential here is that, from a substantive point of view, the carta 
was not capable of establishing anything28, i.e. neither legally nor in any other way binding-
ly. Any terms encompassed in the carta were subject to dispute, and if they were indeed 
disputed – “the terms of the transaction may and must be proved by calling the witnesses to 
it, regardless of any contradiction of the writing”29. Wigmore provides us with an exempla-
ry case that was symptomatic for the then reigning premonitions as to the contestability of 
documents by other evidence. It shall be underlined that the case concerns a dispute that 
took place over two centuries after the Norman conquest, namely in 1292. This case30 con-
cerned a plaintiff filing an assize of mort d’ancestor31 and seeking to recover his seisin32 of 
tenements in a place recorded as “C.”. The defendant replied that he was in good (legal) 
possession of the lands in question as he had been properly enfeoffed by the plaintiff’s fa-
ther. As a means of evidence the defendant produced a charter (a written document), which 
was a deed of the plaintiff’s father. The plaintiff then admitted to the deed being his father’s 
but stated that the tenements had been given to the defendant for one month only, upon the 
                                                          
26 Wigmore, op. cit. 
27 Ficker, op.cit., p. 85. 
28 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 341. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Year Book 20 Edw I, 258 (Edition Horwood). 
31 An action filed by a plaintiff who wanted to recover the possession of an inheritable estate of his predecessor, 
usually his father (see: Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, p. 1101, mort d’ancestor). 
32 I.e., Possession. 
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passing of which the defendant was supposed to have married the plaintiff’s sister or return 
the tenements to the plaintiff’s father. None of these conditions were in fact included in the 
charter. The plaintiff’s father had died before the passing of the month and the defendant 
had not wed his opponent’s sister. The defendant replied again that the deed was simple and 
that there were no conditions to be found within its content as the ones alleged by the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff, however, replied that whatever the words of the charter may have been, 
the arrangements of the covenant between his father and the defendant and their friends had 
been just as he claimed. The jury stated that the contract was as the plaintiff had motioned 
and the judge entered judgement for the plaintiff upon establishing that the defendant’s sei-
sin was conditional, that the condition had not been performed by the defendant’s default 
and therefore his seisin was null, the plaintiff’s father had died seised of his estate and there-
fore the plaintiff was awarded the assize. Here we can see very well how a written docu-
ment, unambiguous, unequivocal and clear, was legally perceived as containing only some 
of the parties’ stipulations, and how oral evidence had helped the plaintiff win the case. 
Another proper demonstration of the then reigning rule of admissibility of extrinsic ev-
idence against written contracts was the so-called wager of law33 – a defence allowing the 
defendant to prove his lack of liability by proclaiming it under oath and gathering a required 
number of witnesses (called the compurgators – usually eleven34 or twelve of them, some-
times more35), to swear that they believed the defendant’s oath36. A successful wager of law 
was sufficient to outweigh a written document37 (as Blackstone puts it: “he shall go free and 
for ever acquitted of the debt, or other cause of action”38).  
Obviously, the very fact that we say that a wager of law was sufficient to outweigh a 
written document it may be inferred that there were certain instances when a written docu-
ment would suffice to prove the plaintiff’s case, or when a piece of writing would, in the 
ambiguity of other evidence, serve as decisive, but nevertheless this means that a document 
                                                          
33 Known in Latin as vadiatio legis. 
34 John Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, Revised 6th Edition, Philadelphia 1856. 
35 Þorleifur Guðmundsson Repp, A Historical Treatise on Trial by Jury, Wager of Law and other Co-Ordinate 
Forensic Institutions. 
36 J.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 4th edition, London 2002, p. 6. 
37 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 340. 
38 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Volume 2, New York 1828. 
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was contestable by other evidence. There was simply no recognised law that would prevent 
writing from being prone to being contested by other forms of evidence. As O.W. Holmes 
put it: “It was evidence either way, and is called so in many of the early cases”39. 
It shall thus be summed up that in the early mediaeval period, i.e. from the beginning of 
Anglo-Saxon rule in England until well after the Norman conquest of 1066, there was no 
such notion in the common law as the parol evidence rule nor were there any earlier forms 
of it. It was a period of the dominance of oral forms of juridical acts and especially of oral 
evidence. No substantive legal rules existed that would pertain to written instruments being 
irrebuttable by extrinsic evidence. 
2.4. RISE OF THE SEAL40 – A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The tell-tale element of what was characteristic of the second of the periods mentioned 
above began with the so-called rise of the seal. The seal was a piece of wax affixed to a 
paper or other material on which a promise, release or conveyance was written that served 
as a means of proving its authenticity41. It originally consisted of wax bearing the imprint of 
an individualised signet ring, and though this requirement was relaxed in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, throughout the periods described in this article it did not change. As late as in the 
17th century, Lord Coke stated that wax without an impression was not a seal42. Use of the 
seal in England began in the 11th century43, after the Norman conquest, but it was not until it 
became common among ordinary people that its importance as a contractual instrument 
began, and only since then can we perceive it as a factor in the emergence of the parol evi-
dence rule. At first it was used exclusively by the king, thence its legal value sparked from 
the principle that the king is not capable of attesting lies and receiving lies from his subjects, 
and that his word is indisputable44. The king’s seal affixed to a document made the truth of 
                                                          
39 O.W. Holmes, The Common Law, New York 2009, p. 184. 
40 See, generally: E.M. Holmes, Stature and Status of a Promise under Seal as a Legal Formality, “Willamette 
Law Review” 617 (1993), p. 625-637. 
41 Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1466, seal. 
42 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 1979, § 96 cmt. A. 
43 Frederick Pollock, Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, Lon-
don 1898, vol. I, p. 78. 
44 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 342. 
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the document immune to being undermined. The attestation of a private document by the 
king or his representatives was much sought after45. 
The popularity of the seal “trickled down” from the king to, first, senior members of the 
clergy (bishops) and counts to, later, an ever-growing part of the nobility and estate-holders. 
What is peculiar here is that the relevance of the king’s seal was attributed to seals used by 
other people. Then it became, as Ficker duly notes, popular for those that had not yet ob-
tained a seal (for various reasons) to ask those that possessed the benefit of having a seal to 
attach it to a document, thus guaranteeing its authenticity46. As Wigmore states: “as the ha-
bitual use of seal extends downwards, its valuable attributes go with it”47. The reason, as 
some suggest, may simply be the fact that a seal is more difficult to forge than a signature, 
not to mention an illiterate mark made with the stroke of a pen48. Ultimately, this led to or-
dinary freemen obtaining and using seals. The process of the seal gaining in importance to 
the point that it became common had, as we have seen, begun in the 11th century, and was 
not rapid at first – after all, as late as during the times of Henry II seals were said to belong 
properly only to kings and to very great men49. Notwithstanding, the process of seals be-
coming common was practically complete by the thirteenth century50 – “at the date of the 
Conquest the Norman duke had a seal […] before the end of the thirteenth century the free 
and lawful man usually had a seal”51. This marked the dawn of the significance of transac-
tion witnesses, as the qualities of a witness were attributed to the seal and the parties could 
expect a sealed document to be a sufficient means of proving that a transaction had taken 
place. They could also rely on (though only to some extent, as we shall soon see) a sealed 
document to prove the terms of such a transaction because the potential opponent, having 
certified the given document with his seal, could not renege on its terms anymore. Neverthe-
                                                          
45 Ibidem. 
46 Ficker, op. cit., p. 94. 
47 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 342. 
48 Holmes, op. cit., p. 184. 
49 Ibidem. 
50 Harry Bresslau, Handbuch der Urkundenlehre, Leipzig 1889, p. 534. 
51 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., p. 221. 
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less, the situation was far from allowing one to form a general rule that would have prohib-
ited the use of extrinsic evidence against a written instrument as of then.  
2.5. OBSTACLES AGAINST THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE IN 
THE LATE MIDDLE AGES – EVOLVING CONCEPTS 
Though the basic notions of the indisputability of a document and the incontestability 
of its terms had developed, as can be observed, before the end of the thirteenth century, still 
the parol evidence rule was far from emerging and the general significance of written in-
struments was very distant from its final form. What were the reasons for this? 
It must be underlined here that transactions which were most important at that time – 
which, for obvious reasons, were those pertaining to land – were still performed in the old 
ritual forms. The transfer of an estate was done by the so-called livery of seisin (roughly 
equivalent to the continental transfer of possession), to which the charter was only second-
ary. As Wigmore put it: “whatever the virtue there is in writing is testimonial only”52. This, 
it is fair to say, was a very peculiar state of matters and one that was very prone to lability. 
A written document was no more and no less than proof of a transaction, not a necessary 
one, but otherwise hardly contestable (if at all present). One may ask if it was thus not 
tempting for the parties to gain for themselves a piece of indisputable evidence, and was not 
the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence the only logical conclusion of attributing incontest-
ability to the documents? The answer is yes, but there was the obstacle as described above. 
The fact was that the main part of a transaction was some juridical act done apart from the 
writing. Most of these acts, especially those concerning immovable property, were done in 
oral forms53. A writing merely “testified”, i.e. “witnessed” what was in fact done beyond the 
writing itself54. The important, substantive element of a transaction happened elsewhere. If 
so then why dully accept the terms of the writing? If the writing is no more than just evi-
dence, it may always be countered with contrary evidence. 
                                                          
52 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 343. 
53 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. p. 202 & 217. 
54 Interestingly, this rhetoric persisted much later, at a time when undoubtedly a document was more than just the 
evidence of an act completed beside the document. William Sheppard, Touchstone of Common Assurances, 7th 
Edition, London 1820, p. 50: “a deed is a writing or instrument […] sealed and delivered to prove and testify 
the agreement of the parties whose deed is to the thing contained in the deed). 
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2.6. THE LAW OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS – A HARBINGER OF THINGS TO 
COME 
One area of law where the idea of the indisputability of written documents appeared 
earliest and quickly gained a serious foothold was commercial law. In this area a sealed 
document was deemed as incontestable as early as in the 1300s55. Such was the mercantile 
custom that became, not formally, an element of the lex mercatoria (or the Law Merchant, 
as it is usually called in England). This was obviously caused by the specificity of mer-
chants’ activities in an era predating most developments such as banks and systems of ship-
ping. A direct and immediate concern for the merchants of that time was the problem of 
“making returns” – meaning simply carrying back the fruits of one’s trading journeys. Re-
lated to this was the problem of recovering funds, especially pecuniary proceeds from suc-
cessful trade ventures from abroad. One of the ways that the mercantile practice dealt with 
these problems was with the emergence of the “sedentary merchant”, i.e. an element of a 
new form of a trade organisation based on a complex structure. “In the simplest form, the 
merchant would entrust the goods to an agent or an employee who travelled with the goods 
and arranged for their sale and the purchase of return cargo”56. Such a sedentary merchant 
could, via a network of agents, representatives and consignees who were interconnected and 
autonomous to some extent, solve the problem of making returns and returning funds – what 
was of essence, though, was the ability to offer in the mercantile transactions a form of re-
muneration that would be commonly accepted, and such could only be a form of remunera-
tion that was safe and sure. Merchants, especially the Staplers of London in their trade rela-
tions with the mercers of Flanders57, would draw up the so-called exchange bills that would 
allow them to transfer value without physically carrying money. These later evolved into the 
more modern bills and notes. It is not by any means surprising that the doctrine of the incon-
testability of written documents appeared the earliest, then, with respect to commercial con-
tracts. What made it easier and what probably accelerated the emergence of such a doctrine 
in commercial relations was the fact that commercial cases were often tried not by the 
                                                          
55 Wigmore, Op. cit., p. 344. 
56 J.S. Rogers, The Early History of the Law of Bills and Notes, London 1995, p. 33. 
57 E. Power, Wool Trade in the Fifteenth Century [in:] Studies in English Trade and in the Fifteenth Century, E. 
Power, M.M. Postan (eds.), London 1933, p. 39-90. 
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common law courts but by separate mercantile courts58. On the other hand, this same fact 
slowed down diffusion of the doctrine to common law courts. 
There exist in the records some landmark cases that show very well how the doctrine of 
the incontestability of written instruments worked in the area of commerce. First is a case 
from 1222, where it was stated that “by the law merchant a man cannot wage his law 
against a tally”59. If such was the approach toward a tally then even more so toward a writ-
ten document. The same rule is also confirmed in a legal treatise concerning precedents 
useful for pleading in the courts60. It is, however, important not to overemphasise these de-
velopments in the light of the following excerpt from Pollock and Maitland: “by Law Mer-
chant one cannot [sic!] wage his law against a tally; but if he deny the tally, the plaintiff 
must prove the tally”61. So a mere denial was sufficient to turn the burden of proof against 
the claiming party. Clearly, the commercial law of the thirteenth or fourteenth century is too 
early a period to talk about anything as strict as the parol evidence rule in its strict form.  
2.7. RELUCTANCE WITHIN THE LAW OF THE LAND TRANSACTIONS – UNCERTAIN-
TY AND TRANSITION 
In the fourteenth century, deeds regarding the transfer of estates started to become 
“necessary accompaniments”62 of the livery of seisin. This was definitely a sign of things to 
come (as we shall see with respect to the Statute of Frauds), but the incontestability of writ-
ing, not to mention the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to the writing, was still a weak 
concept as late as in the mid-fifteenth century. A renowned legal scholar of the epoch, 
Thomas de Littleton, famously stated63 that if parties make a deed of feoffment64 stipulating 
the transfer of estate under no condition, but in executing this deed the livery of seisin is 
provided with a condition, i.e. an oral one, then that condition is good and enforceable. The 
                                                          
58 Rogers, op. cit., p. 58. 
59 Year Book 20 Edw. I, p. 68. 
60 Brevia Placitata (Publications of the Selden Society, vol. 66, London 1951); Casus Placitorum and the Re-
ports of the Cases in the King’s Court 1272-1278, ed. with an introduction by William Huse Dunham (Publica-
tions of the Selden Society, vol. 69, London 1952). 
61 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., p. 213. 
62 Pollock and Maitland, op. cit., p. 82. 
63 Or actually noted what was the law in his times. 
64 Roughly equivalent to the transfer of property in Continental law. 
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deed is treated as if it had not been made because it contains no condition, and the terms of 
the transaction are actually as provided for at the making of the livery of seisin65. The same 
author also stated that even though theoretically there could be no condition effectively af-
fixed to a lease of a freehold estate if the lease had not been made in a deed, the party eager 
to resort to the condition before a court of law could rely on “a verdict of twelve men taken 
at large” even if he “letteth the same land to another for term of life without deed upon con-
dition to render to the lessor a certain rent”66. Littleton wrote Tenures after he became a 
judge of the common pleas in 146667; the first edition was published in London in 1481 or 
148268. It is difficult not to notice that after all the legal and social changes described above 
the law regarding land transactions would not produce a judgement varying from the one 
referred to above that had been rendered during the rule of Edward I roughly two centuries 
earlier. The huge similarity lies in the ability of the jury to overthrow the clear and explicit 
terms of a deed or to ignore the lack of a deed where the law would ostensibly require one. 
Why then shall we call this period a period of transition? Mainly because the sources 
offer contradictory evidence as to the then reigning approach to matters that were very simi-
lar. First, the same Littleton states that he recognises as a matter of “common learning” that 
a man cannot plead that an estate was made upon condition “if he doth not vouch a record of 
this or show a writing under seal proving the same condition”69. Of course, this opinion 
does not pertain to the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence to the contents of a written in-
strument but to the inability to prove a condition without a writing. But it does show very 
well that the law, settled beforehand, had started shifting in the realm of land transactions. 
Then again, in a Year Book from as late as 1523 we can find the following opinion 
contradicting what was written earlier by Littleton: “[…] for a deed is nothing but a proof 
and testimonial of the agreement of the party, as a deed of feoffment is nothing but a proof 
of the livery, for the land passes by the livery; but when the deed and the livery are joined 
                                                          
65 Thomas de Littleton, edited by: Eugene Wambaugh, Littleton’s Tenures in English, Washington, D.C., 1903, 
p. 171. 
66 Ibidem, p. 174. 
67 Gilman, D. C.; Thurston, H. T.; Colby, F. M., eds., New International Encyclopedia vol. 12, 1st ed., New York 
1905, “Littleton, Thomas", p. 340. 
68 It is worthwhile to notice that the first edition of Tenures was the first book ever printed concerning English 
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69 Littleton, op. cit., p. 173. 
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together, that is a proof of the livery”70. This is yet another contradicting statement as to the 
significance of a deed and its immunity (here its lack) to being overthrown by parol. How-
ever, the common opinion was soon about to change. In fact, even in the fifteenth century 
certain judgements had been rendered that disallowed extrinsic evidence against the con-
tents of written documents, as we shall later see. 
2.8. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE 
As we turn to examine these judgements in order to recreate, finally, the story of how 
the parol evidence rule gained foothold, we shall also focus our attention on the factors and 
circumstances that facilitated the rule’s growth. 
2.8.1. GROWING LITERACY 
First, there was the unquestionable growth of literacy. In England, the approximate lit-
eracy rate rose from less than five per cent in the mid-fifteenth century to about 15% in 
1550 and, astonishingly, to approx. 53% in 165071. Putting aside the reasons for this – the 
most important probably being the invention and spread of printing – the result of the socie-
ty becoming generally much more lettered was a rise in respect shown to written documents 
and, obviously, the dropping of earlier distrust toward charters. Because reading and writing 
were no longer the mysterious skill of a chosen few, there spread the notion that a man 
should generally be bound by what he declared in writing72. The idea grew that the written 
words of a transaction should be binding to the denying party, as they could easily prevent 
against the writing being deficient in some terms and representations73. In what may be per-
ceived as one of the early instances of the full-fledged parol evidence rule’s application in a 
case74, it was famously stated: “because words are oftentimes spoken by men unadvisedly 
and without deliberation, the law has provided that a contract by words shall not bind with-
                                                          
70 As per Brudnel, J; Year Book 14 H. VIII 17, 6 and 7. 
71 Max Roser, Literacy, Published online (2016) at OurWorldInData.org, Retrieved from: 
https://ourworldindata.org/literacy/, 28.04.2016. 
72 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 345. 
73 First noted as early as in 1430, Year Book 8 H. VI, 26, 15, per Babington, J, speaking of a party that had ne-
glected to seeing to encompass certain provisions in a deed: “It will be adjudged my own folly that I did not 
wish to have it written in”. 
74 Sharington v. Strotton, 75 ER 454. 
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out consideration. And the reason is, because it is by words which pass from men lightly and 
inconsiderately, but where the agreement is by deed there is more time for deliberation”. 
Then the judge added that deeds were “adjudged to bind the party without examining upon 
what cause or consideration they were made” to, ultimately, find that a sealed deed is of a 
higher nature than other means of evidence.  
It is worth noticing, however, that the spread of literacy itself was not sufficient for the 
rule to appear – otherwise it would have appeared to be applied whenever both parties to a 
contract could have been proved to be literate75. Thus more contributing factors were re-
quired for the parol evidence rule to emerge.  
2.8.2. THE GROWING PERCEIVED TRUSTWORTHINESS OF WRITING 
Another factor was that the old custom of transaction-witnesses, which were especially 
prevalent in liveries of seisin, was slowly becoming increasingly less popular, up to the 
point that transaction-witnesses were not commonly available76. Together with this there 
grew a general awareness of the lability of witnesses and the weakness of testimonial recol-
lection. On the other hand, there appeared a growing sympathy for writing as being sure and 
trustworthy. Judges realised that there was something wrong with the ability to deny a mat-
ter recorded in writing by simply denying it77. As Lord Coke stated (in a case that we shall 
return to later): “it would be full of great inconvenience that none should know by the writ-
ten words of a will what construction to make or advice to give”78. It is argued that the 
spread of written contracts was tightly related to the change from a subjective theory of con-
tracting (one that states that an agreement exists beyond the contract understood as a written 
instrument) to an objective one (asserting that the document is actually the contract itself)79. 
2.8.3. MERCANTILE CUSTOMS 
                                                          
75 Note that in the case cited above under 31 both parties had been literate, and still witness evidence was al-
lowed to alter the contents of the writing. 
76 Wigmore, op. cit., p. 346. 
77 Ibidem, p. 347. 
78 1591, Lord Cheyney’s Case, The reports of Sir Edward Coke, in English, in thirteen parts complete; with 
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79 T. Cole, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Comparative Analysis and Proposal, University of New South Wales 
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Next, as we have already seen, the path had been paved beforehand by the mercantile 
customs and the Law Merchant. The merchants of England, especially of London, were 
using commercial forms, principally bills and notes which had developed in the previous 
centuries, as a means of hastening and simplifying transactions. The mercantile practice had 
already ascribed the value of indisputability to written documents. 
2.8.4. RESTRAINING THE JURIES 
The third factor was a more legal-political one that was related to the judicial desire to 
control the jury80. Judges, as professional lawyers, were always wary of juries and their 
ways of twisting the factual backgrounds of cases so as to bypass the law. Judges wanted to 
keep from the jury the oral parts of contracts to prevent them from misusing the parol (i.e. 
oral) evidence to overturn the words of a writing. “[…] the distrust of the juries is one of the 
pillars of the parol evidence rule… [which] …is not applicable in equitable actions that 
traditionally were tried to the chancellor without a jury”81.  
Interestingly, is has been pointed out that a very similar process is taking place nowa-
days, with the courts perceiving restrictions to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence as a 
method of preventing juries from “hearing evidence that could cause them to lend more 
weight to their sympathies than to the facts of the case82”. 
The cases cited earlier in this article show very well how a jury could tear a written in-
strument apart if it so willed. If parol evidence was generally allowed then the case had to be 
decided by a jury on its factual terms, “and there was no telling what the jury might do”83. 
As a judge stated in a later case84, every deed was thought to consist of two parts – the mat-
ter of fact and the matter of law. The matter of fact was averred by the party and was triable 
by the jurors; the matter of law, however, was to be discussed by the judges of the law. If 
the matter of fact was as strict as it was worded in a deed then clearly the whole adjudication 
belonged solely to the judges. And so if the judges wanted to keep control of an adjudicated 
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case in their hands, a doctrine had to be adapted which would exclude parol evidence as 
such. 
This required that the judges switch from how the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence 
was perceived earlier, i.e. as a testimonial rule, to a new approach that would finally make it 
a rule of substantive law. Earlier, as the parol evidence rule was gaining a hold, it was re-
duced to being a waiver of ordinary proof. A person who had produced a sealed document 
was disallowed to effectively come forward with contradictory evidence of other sorts. This 
ban, however, was operative by a legal fiction that the person had in fact waived his right to 
bring his evidence and had done so in advance85. He was, as it was worded in the epoch, 
estopped from using extrinsic proof, and by his own sealed act. Later this evolved, however, 
into a substantive law rule.  
How considerably significant in the process of the emergence of the parol evidence rule 
was the judges’ distrust toward juries may well be demonstrated by noting that the parol 
evidence rule never emerged in equitable actions86. This must be deemed very telling upon 
reflecting that actions in equity had always been tried in a chancery court, i.e. before a chan-
cellor and without a jury. 
2.8.5. THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE AS A MEANS OF CORRECTING THE “OBJEC-
TIVE INTENTION” DOCTRINE 
This general lack of trust toward juries was recently also underlined as one of the major 
factors for the emergence and prevalence of the parol evidence rule in English law together 
with the notion of objective intention87. Some authors have even described this aforemen-
tioned notion as the reason for the general literalism that is prevalent in common law and in 
common law interpretation88. The objective intention rule is understood by English courts as 
the need to enforce the intention “which the party in question by his actions or words dis-
plays to the other, not some hidden intention which he may have concealed in the inner 
reaches of his mind”89. Interpreting objective intention inevitably leads to one asking oneself 
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whether this objective intention is tantamount to what the reasonable parties truly had in 
mind or maybe to what the parties should have had in mind had they been reasonable. The 
second concept is visibly flexible and allows for a high level of judicial discretion. One of 
the factors that helps limit the influence of the notoriously vague notion of objective inten-
tion in contractual interpretation is the inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence; for where ob-
jective intention matters, evidence of intention is just as important as the intention itself90, 
and thus the restrictive approach to whence the evidence may be drawn. Disallowing the 
courts to search for meaning somewhere beyond the scope of a written instrument helps 
restore the certainty that the doctrine of objective intention could not provide if supplement-
ed with the courts’ ability to utilise extrinsic evidence.91.  
2.8.6. THE DIFFERENT QUALITIES OF DIFFERENT EVIDENCE 
Then there appeared the concept of varying qualities of certain means of evidence. We 
have already seen this in the case of Sharington v. Strotton, where the court determined that 
certain acts are not to be overthrown by other proof because of the former’s higher nature – 
thus assuming that juridical acts may be of varying, i.e. higher or lower, nature. Francis 
Bacon, moreover, in a treatise regarding the rules of common law of the time, asserted that a 
patent ambiguity in a document may not be averred because “the law will not couple and 
mingle matters of specialty, which is of a higher account, with matter of averment, which is 
of inferior account in law”92. Finally, in a decision regarded as formative and decisive to the 
emergence of the parol evidence rule93, parol evidence was unambiguously dismissed be-
cause “every contract or agreement ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as 
the 
first deed”. 
The new approach also saw a shift in how written documents were perceived. Earlier, a 
deed was but proof of a transaction that took place beside it. This notion is, interestingly, 
still prevalent in American law, where dominant is the subjective theory of contracting ac-
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cording to which the written document produced by the parties is merely a memorandum of 
the agreement that they have reached94. “Judges adhering to this doctrine have no qualms 
about admitting extrinsic evidence in order to ascertain each party’s intent, even where the 
parties thought that they had created a final expression of their agreement”95. The fourteenth 
century was a period when this concept was struggling for approval, but by the early 1600s96 
it was already settled that the written document is the transaction itself. This concept is 
called the operative notion of a writing. Wigmore argues that the development of the opera-
tive notion of a writing was reinforced by the development of the parol evidence rule under-
stood as a rule of inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence. If no extrinsic evidence is admissi-
ble, then a sealed instrument will “discharge” all earlier transactions or stipulations pertain-
ing to what is embodied in the instrument. All previous arrangements are not demonstrable, 
so the whole contractual relation of the parties is reduced to what is written; and only that of 
the previous arrangements is binding what the parties merged into the written form. Thus 
there is no transaction beyond what the parties had encompassed in the writing and thus – 
the writing itself becomes the transaction97.  
If the writing is the sole act encompassing the whole transaction and is the transaction 
itself, then it is because of its very nature that no extrinsic evidence shall be allowed. There 
simply is no point in not dismissing it, because even if it stood in total contrast to the con-
tents of the deed the deed would still prevail intact. The logical conclusion is to accept that it 
is owing to the nature of the writing that it should not bail extrinsic evidence. Thus it be-
comes clear how the parol evidence rule became a rule of substantive law, not just a proce-
dural one. 
It is worthwhile to take into scope the case usually credited as the one in which the pa-
rol evidence rule was established in its fullest form (prior to the enactment of the Statute of 
Frauds). Some authors, even nowadays, go as far as to state that the parol evidence rule’s 
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origins may be traced to this case98, however, in the light of the previous remarks this cannot 
be deemed true – it is fair to say there are further reaching traces of the rule. 
The Countess Rutland’s Case (1605)99 actually concerned a trespass allegation brought 
forth by the Countess Isabel, the widow of Edward, the third Earl of Rutland, against Roger 
– the fifth Earl of Rutland. The dispute arose from a conflict between two written contracts 
that had both been made by Edward and concerned a property by the name of Eykering 
House, and both were about entrusting the property. The first of these contracts stipulated 
that upon Edward’s death the trustees shall ensure that the property stay in Isabel’s posses-
sion, and only after her subsequent death should it be conveyed to Roger. The second con-
tract, made half a year later, concerned a vast set of lands including Eykering House, and 
under the term that the property shall be conveyed to Roger after Edward’s death. As Coke’s 
report tells us, the witnesses’ testimonies proved that Edward had told various people that 
Isabel shall have the property. The court, however, held that a written deed would bar parol 
evidence. Moreover, such were the instructions that the judge provided to the jury. Coke 
commented that “it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on 
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties 
should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain testimony of 
slippery memory”. 
2.9. STATUTE OF FRAUDS OF 1677 – PEAK SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PAROL EVI-
DENCE RULE. OBJECTIVE THEORY OF A CONTRACT 
The waiver theory as discussed above was complacent with the subjective theory of 
contracting according to which the existence of a binding agreement between the parties is 
determined by the existence of the concurrence of intention. Modern theory of contracts in 
common law prefers the objective approach, which relies on external acts of the parties to 
determine the existence and contents of a contract. 
The processes as described above, influenced by the factors therein listed, led to the fi-
nal taking of shape of the parol evidence rule in the late seventeenth century100. The emer-
                                                          
98 See e.g. Epstein G., Archer T., Davis Sh., Extrinsic Evidence, Parol Evidence, and the Parol Evidence Rule: A 
Call for Courts to Use the Reasoning of the Restatements Rather than the Rhetoric of Common Law, 44 N. M. 
L. Rev. 49-87 (2014), p. 57. 
99 Coke’s Reports, Part 6, sec. 52b. 
100 Kevin M. Teeven, A History of the Anglo-American Common Law of Contract, New York 1990, par. 110 n. 
89. 
  26 
gence of the second approach was facilitated by the enactment of the Statute of Frauds101 in 
1677. The Statute in its first and third sections mentioned an estate in land as being “as-
signed, granted or surrendered” by “deed or note in writing”. This brief but novel regulation 
brought forth two important notions: first, it confirmed that a legal act might not only be 
proved by a writing but that it may actually be constituted by the document – the document 
itself being the very act it encompassed. Furthermore, the Statute not only confirmed but 
actually made it a requirement for effective conveyances that the transfer of ownership be 
made in writing.  
At the same time, the Statute introduced the novel feature that a document might be an 
ordinary piece of writing in its simplest form, not necessarily a deed under seal. Wigmore 
argues102 that the significance of the Statute was mainly that it, first, eliminated the possibil-
ity of creating, granting and leasing estates in freehold by oral livery of seisin, thus substi-
tuting it with a mandatory documental form. Second, it permitted for the document to be just 
an ordinary piece of writing – without the seal. The requirement of a written form for the 
transfer of an estate underlined the constitutive (as opposed to testimonial only) character of 
a document. The acceptance of ordinary writing as a means equivalent to a deed led the 
courts to apply the parol evidence rule to everything that had been encompassed in writing, 
notwithstanding the lack of a seal103. The reasons for this seem quite clear. If a certain trans-
action must be done in writing, as otherwise it is null and void, then everything undertaken, 
discussed or done beyond the writing is also null and void. The lawyers of the era were con-
vinced that if a contract requires that it be done in writing to be valid then nothing shall be 
established in court based on evidence extrinsic to that writing. 
What is even more interesting is that the Statute of Frauds became a source of inspira-
tion for arguments pertaining to matters not regulated in the Statute itself. And so the Statute 
was believed to typify a general principle. In a certain case in 1696104, for instance, which 
did not regard the transfer of an estate, parol evidence with respect to the testator pos-
sessing, in fact, an intention contrary to the contents of a will was dismissed. Lieutenant 
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Chief Justice Holt even stated that: “the great uncertainty there is of proof in this case 
shows how necessary it was to make the statute against frauds and perjuries”. These words 
perfectly show how the Statute of Frauds was interpreted as a regulation that disallowed the 
admissibility of extrinsic evidence contrary or additional to a writing. 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
From the early Anglo-Norman law to the enactment of the Statute of Frauds, the issue 
of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to add to, vary or contradict the contents of a writ-
ing underwent vast changes. Concepts and notions shifted, sometimes heavily, sometimes 
only slightly – but to produce very different results. The specificity of common law mani-
fests itself in that because there were, until the Statute of Frauds, almost no codifications of 
relevant law there were some judgements rendered that, from today’s perspective, we would 
perceive as ahead of their time – and others that may seem to have lagged behind.  
This article traces the early beginnings of the notion of the inadmissibility of extrinsic 
evidence, starting with the general distrust toward writing in Anglo-Norman times. We have 
examined the advent of the sealed document, how it managed to gain increasingly higher 
ground and how it became the practice in day-to-day relations. We have also observed how 
the law changed to reflect the social changes – apart from the judges’ eagerness to diminish 
the juries’ role, all other changes of concepts described herein were brought about as a result 
of changes in approach in the society. 
All in all, the legal changes described in the article here took place in the search for 
more justified and fairer judgements. The very same reasons, interestingly, led to the subse-
quent easing of the rule in the nineteenth century and in modern law. 
The parol evidence rule reached its absolute peak significance along with the Statute of 
Frauds, encompassing all writings, even in the ordinary written form, and many types of 
legal relations. It was, then, an absolute rule that had no exceptions, yet only for a short pe-
riod of time. Quickly, exceptions began to appear, and the rule’s early rigidness yielded. 
Nowadays, after the Law Commission which states that the rule is subject to so many excep-
tions that it hardly exists anymore, one might say that its importance as an absolute rule is 
purely historical. This is undoubtedly so, but in terms of historical importance it is essential, 
as the history of the rule’s emergence and development shows very well, on the one hand, 
how total admissibility of extrinsic evidence led to judgements that were simply unfair but, 
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on the other hand, how the absolutely stringent approach to the rule after it had emerged led 
to results that were equally unfair. 
  
* * *  
The emergence of the parol evidence rule in english law. 
 
Summary: The article discusses the historical development of the parol evidence rule in the English 
common law from the Anglo-Norman law to the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677. A fea-
ture of early English law was the general admissibility of extrinsic evidence contradicting, supple-
menting or varying the contents of a document. Documents were generally distrusted by a mostly 
illiterate populace, and there was a common belief that a legal act essentially happened beyond the 
writing – thus making the writing only, at best, evidential. The needs of commercial practice and the 
shifting beliefs of a growingly literate society led, in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, to a general 
conviction that writing encompassed the very essence of a transaction and that a transaction, if writ-
ten in a document, essentially consisted of the document. This, together with a distrust for juries that 
were prone to rendering judgements as contradictory to the contents of a document, influenced Eng-
lish judges to form a principle of inadmissibility of extrinsic evidence – the parol evidence rule. Sub-
sequently, the enactment of the Statute of Frauds that required certain transactions to be done in writ-
ing was commonly interpreted by English lawyers as statutory acknowledgement and confirmation of 
the parol evidence rule.  
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